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Rather, the court

relied upon all the evidence which had been accumulating from the
time the ..

'
SIPC, in fact, had
. [action was] initially commenced."""

conceded at the district court proceeding that the court should make
its own finding about the ability of Hughes, Inc. to meet its obligations
to customers within the meaning of the 1970 Act.117 On the facts of the
case, the Second Circuit found that the district court had recognized its
responsibility under the 1970 Act, and that its responsibility had been
fulfilled upon sufficient evidence." 8
The importance of the decision rendered by the Second Circuit in
this case stems not from the complexity of the issues involved, but
rather from the fact that it is a case of first impression. 119 In SEC v.
Alan F. Hughes, Inc. the court made the initial adjudication of consti20
tutional considerations under the 1970 Act.1

ARBITRATION

Axelrod & Co. v. Kordich, Victor & Neufeld
Coenen v. Pressprich
An apparent conflict between stock exchange rules and provisions
of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
was resolved when the Second Circuit, in separate cases, held 1) that a
non-member may use the rules of an exchange to compel a member
firm to arbitrate a dispute and 2) that a member firm may likewise
compel an allied member to arbitrate.
121
In the first case, Axelrod & Co. v. Kordich, Victor & Neufeld,
the non-member defendant, alleging breach of a common stock purchase contract, 1 22 had commenced arbitration proceedings before the
question to be resolved. If a case places "adjudicative facts" in dispute, a trial seems best
suited. I DAvis, ADMINISTRATVE LAW TREATIsE § 702, at 413 (1958).
The complex fact questions raised in a determination as to the financial stability of
a SIPC member are of an adjudicative nature and, therefore, worthy of a due process
hearing. No such hearing was guaranteed upon the initial determination and, as the
Second Circuit concluded, a cursory review of the initial findings would not remedy the
due process issue. See generally 461 F.2d at 979 n.8.
116 461 F.2d at 981.
117 Id.
118 Id. at 982.
119 Id. at 976.
120 Prior to the instant case the only other aspect of the 1970 Act which had been
adjudicated was the question of retroactivity. It was held in Loff v. Casey, 330 F. Supp.
93,589 (10th Cir.), that the
856 (D. Colo. 1971) (mem.), aff'd, CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
1970 Act affords protection only to the customers of those firms which were actually in
business on or after the effective date of the legislation. In the Loff case the firm seeking
1970 Act status had been adjudicated a bankrupt prior to December 30, 1970. Id. at 857.
121 451 F.2d 838 (2d Cir. 1971).
122 Axelrod had contracted to purchase five thousand shares of On Site Energy Sys-
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New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) against Axelrod & Co., a member
firm. Axelrod responded by suing for rescission of the contract in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.
Axelrod claimed fraudulent misrepresentation in violation of both the
Securities Act of 1933123 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.124 A
temporary restraining order staying the arbitration proceedings was
issued by the district court on the plaintiff's motion. Subsequently,
defendant's cross motion, made pursuant to section 3 of the United
States Arbitration Act 125 for a stay of the action pending completion of
arbitration was granted and the injunction dissolved. The court held
that the non-member firm had standing to require arbitration of its
2
dispute with the NYSE member firm under the Stock Exchange rules.
127
The Second Circuit affirmed.
Consistent with the policy of self-regulation effected by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,128 the NYSE requires arbitration of a dispute
tems Corp. for $54,750. Tender of the shares was refused and the defendant sold the
shares to another party for a consideration of substantially less value than that specified
in its original contract with Axelrod. Id. at 839-40.
123 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq. (1970).
12415 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. (1970).
125 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1970) provides:
If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United States
upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such
arbitration, the court in which such suit is pending, upon being satisfied that
the issue involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under
such an agreement, shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of
the action until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the
agreement, providing the applicant for the stay is not in default in proceeding
with such arbitration.
126 320 F. Supp. 193 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
127 451 F.2d at 843.
128 Congress's enactment of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq.
(1970) provided for the self government of Stock Exchanges. 451 F.2d at 840 and cases
cited therein.
The courts have been inclined to rule in favor of arbitration in matters involving
securities dealers when such holdings would not compromise the protection afforded
customers by the anti-waiver provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. See generally In re Revenue Properties Litigation Cases, 451 F.2d
310 (1st Cir. 1971) (defendant broker was required to arbitrate at instance of third party
defendant); Daniel v. Board of Trade of City of Chicago, 164 F.2d 815 (7th Cir. 1947)
(commodities board chosen to represent buyer and seller was arbitrator, not mere stakeholder and its actions precluded suit absent a showing of bad faith); Isaacson v. Hayden,
Stone Inc., 319 F. Supp. 929 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (plaintiff, a former allied member, was required to arbitrate his dispute with member firm notwithstanding that plaintiff had
relinquished his allied member status after the dispute arose and prior to commencement
of his action); Brown v. Gilligan, Will & Co., 287 F. Supp. 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (buyer of
unregistered stock, uninformed that it was sold by controlling stockholder, was required
to arbitrate dispute with defendant broker); Robinson v. Bache & Co., 227 F. Supp. 456
(S.D.N.Y. 1964) (plaintiff securities buyer who brought diversity action against defendant
broker without alleging violations of the Securities Act of 1933 or Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 was nevertheless required to arbitrate); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc. v. Griesenbeck, 28 App. Div. 2d 99, 281 N.YS.2d 580 (1st Dep't 1967) (action
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between a member firm and a non-member at the instance of the nonmember.1 29 Therefore, Axelrod was clearly bound by article VIII, section 1 of the New York Stock Exchange Constitution to arbitrate its
dispute. 130
Axelrod insisted, however, that compulsory arbitration of the complaint alleging violation of the Securities Act of 1983 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 was barred by sections 14131 and 29(a) 13 2 of the
respective Acts which nullify any waiver of legal rights granted by the
Acts. The language of section 29(a) of the 1934 Act is almost identical
to that of section 14 of the 1933 Act. The latter provision was interpreted by the United States Supreme Court in Wilko v. Swan' 33 which
held an agreement to arbitrate any future controversy between a plaintiff customer and a defendant brokerage house void notwithstanding
34
section 3 of the Arbitration Act.
The Second Circuit distinguished Axelrod from Wilko on two
separate grounds, i.e., differences both in the status of the respective
parties and in the policy considerations applicable to the two cases.
Section 28(b) of the 1934 Act' 35 removes from the scope of stipulaarising from short sale on London Exchange to cover drop in price of copper futures on
New York Commodity Exchange had sufficient nexus with COMEX to require arbitration
under COMEX bylaws); E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Bokelmann, 56 Misc. 2d 910, 290 N.Y.S.2d
415 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1968) (plaintiff member firm and former employer of defendant
was required to arbitrate dispute over restrictive covenant in defendant's employment
contract); Osborne & Thurlow v. Hirsch & Co., 10 Misc. 2d 225, 172 N.Y.S.2d 522 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1958) (libel action brought by plaintiff former member firm against defendant
member firm was stayed pending arbitration notwithstanding that plaintiff relinquished
member firm status by dissolution prior to suit since cause of action arose while plaintiff
was a member firm).
129 Article VIII, section 1 of the New York Stock Exchange Constitution states that:
Any controversy between parties who are members, allied members, member firms
or member corporations shall, at the instance of any such party, and any controversy between a non-member and a member or allied member or member firm
or member corporation arising out of the business of such member, allied member,
member firm or member corporation ....
shall, at the instance of such nonmember, be submitted for arbitration, in accordance with the provisions of the
Constitution and the rules of the Board of Directors.
2 CCH NEw YoRK STOCK EXCHANGE GuiDE, CONsTIrUTION,
1003 (1972). It should be noted
that where one of the parties is a non-member, arbitration may be required only at his
instance.
130 See Brown v. Gilligan, Will & Co., 287 F. Supp. 766, 769-70 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
131 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1970) provides:
Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person acquiring any security

to waive compliance with any provision of this subchapter or of the rules and
regulations of the Commission shall be void.
132 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (1970) provides:
Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person to waive compliance
with any provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder, or of
any rule of an exchange required thereby shall be void.
133 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
134 Id.

at 438.

135 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(b) (1970) provides:

.
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tions made void by section 29(a) agreements by exchange members to
arbitrate disputes in accordance with exchange rules. This exception
to the non-waiver provision of the Act applies only to exchange members and could not be invoked by the plaintiff customer in Wilko to
require arbitration. However, since Axelrod is a member firm, it falls
within the purview of the section and may therefore be compelled to
arbitrate. The Second Circuit also held that notwithstanding the
absence of similar language in the Securities Act of 1933, section 28(b)'s
exception to the anti-waiver provisions of the 1934 Act is also applicable
to the anti-waiver provisions of the 1933 Act, the two acts being "in pari
materia and... [construable] as one body of law."''l3
The Second Circuit noted that the benefits of permitting litigation
in Wilko would not result from a similar decision in Axelrod. In Wilko,
the Supreme Court looked behind the anti-waiver provision of the
statute and found a legislative intent to protect the small investor from
the superior bargaining advantage held by the brokerage firms with
whom he dealt.'37 This purpose, while served by nullification of the
plaintiff's agreement to arbitrate in Wilko, would not be promoted by
relieving Axelrod, a member brokerage firm, of its obligation to arbitrate.
Nine months after Axelrod, the Second Circuit, in a similar decision, held that a dispute between an allied member 3 8 of the NYSE and
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to modify existing law (1) with regard
to the binding effect on any member of any exchange of any action taken by the
authorities of such exchange to settle disputes between its members ....
136 451 F.2d at 843. See Brown v. Gilligan, Will & Co., 287 F. Supp. 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
See also In re Revenue Properties Litigation Cases, 451 F.2d 310 (1st Cir. 1971) (Although
the court agreed with the interpretation that section 28(b) of the 1934 Act also applied
to the 1933 Act, it was able to require arbitration of a customer-broker dispute by finding
that the anti-waiver provisions of the 1933 Act did not apply to a sales transaction which
contained no agreement requiring arbitration, the only requirement of arbitration being
in the Stock Exchange Constitution.)
137 451 F.2d at 842-43.
138 The New York Stock Exchange Constitution provides the following definition:
Article I
(d) Allied Member. The term 'allied member' means:
(i) a general partner in a member firm who is not a member of the Exchange
and who has become an allied member as provided in Article IX, or
(ii) an employee of a member corporation who is actively engaged in its
business and devotes the major portion of his time thereto, who is not a member
of the Exchange, who has become an allied member as provided in Article IX,
and who is either:
(a) a director and a holder of record and beneficial owner of voting
stock of such corporation, or
(b) a principal executive officer and a holder of record and beneficial
owner of voting stock of such corporation, or
(c) a holder of record and beneficial owner of 5% or more of the outstanding voting stock of such corporation.
2 CCH NEv YORK STOCK EXCHANGE GumE, CONSTITUTION,
1003 (1972).

394

0

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:370

a member brokerage firm must be arbitrated. In Coenen v. Pressprich,3 9
the plaintiff contended that a dispute' 40 between himself and the defendant NYSE member firm which arose prior to the plaintiff's attainment of allied member status' 4 ' was not within the scope of the arbitration clause of the New York Stock Exchange Constitution. The Second
Circuit rejected this argument and affirmed the district court's decision
granting the defendant's motion to stay the action pending arbitra42
tion.
In addition to the policy considerations of protecting the small
Article IX
Sec. 9 Any person, not a member of the Exchange, shall become an allied member
of the Exchange by pledging himself to abide by the Constitution as the same
has been or shall be from time to time amended, and by all rules adopted pursuant to the Constitution and by either
(a) becoming a general partner in a member firm, or
(b) becoming a holder of record and beneficial owner of 5% or more
of the outstanding voting stock of a member corporation, or
(c) becoming a director and a holder of record and beneficial owner of
voting stock of a member corporation, or
(d) becoming a principal executive officer and a holder of record and
beneficial owner of voting stock of a member corporation.
Such pledge to abide by the Constitution and Rules shall be made by written
instrument filed with the Exchange in which the signer pledges himself as aforesaid.
Id. at 9 1409.
'89 453 F.2d 1209 (2d Cir. 1972).
140 Plaintiff's complaint states three causes of action based on an alleged conspiracy
between R. W. Pressprich & Co., a brokerage firm, and Stirling Homex Corporation to
force his sale of shares in the latter company at an unconscionably low price. The first
is a claim under the common law and UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 8-401 which requires
an issuer to register transfer of a security when criteria enumerated in the statute have
been met. The second count asserts a scheme to defraud plaintiff under rule lOb-5, 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1971), promulgated in furtherance of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970). Finally, count three of plaintiff's complaint asserts
violations of Sherman Act §§ 1, 2, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1970) and Clayton Act §§ 4, 12, 15
U.S.C. §§ 15, 22 (1970).
Plaintiff, while a director of Stirling Homex Corporation, is alleged to have purchased
90,000 shares of unregistered Stirling stock for "investment purposes." The shares were
imprinted with a restrictive legend prohibiting transfer unless registered in accordance
with the Securities Act of 1933 or Stirling received satisfactory opinion of counsel that
registration wasn't required. (For the type of restrictive legend used see I P-H SECURITIES
REGULATION,

How

To COMPLY wrrH

SEC RuLEs J 115.4 (1972)). Following this transaction,

Pressprich sold 1,175,000 shares of Stirling stock to the public pursuant to a registration
statement. Plaintiff alleged that his subsequent attempt to sell his 90,000 shares to raise
needed cash was thwarted by Pressprich and Stirling ostensibly for lack of registration or
satisfactory opinion of counsel that registration was not required, but actually to limit the
number of shares available to the market and thus artificially support the price of Stirling
stock. It was further alleged that as a result of misrepresentations and coercion by
Pressprich, plaintiff was eventually forced to sell his stock through Pressprich to an institutional buyer at the inequitable price of ten dollars per share.
141 When Coenen & Co. became a member of the NYSE, the plaintiff, an officer of that
brokerage firm, became an allied member of the Exchange and a party to a contract with
both the Exchange and its members of which the constitution and stock exchange rules
were a part.
142 453 F.2d at 1212.
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investor promulgated in Axelrod, the court distinguished Coenen from
Wilko on the basis of differences in the statutes under which each action
was brought. 143 It also noted that the sequence of the arbitration agree44
ment and the occurrence of the dispute differed in the two cases.
Coenen's contention that the exchange constitution's arbitration
clause is restricted to future disputes, i.e., those arising subsequent to
attainment of member status by both parties, was rejected upon examination of the constitution's text which refers to "any controversy" and
not merely to future controversies. 4 5
The third count in plaintiff's complaint alleged anti-trust law infractions, viz., conspiracy to restrain trade in and monopolize the market for the subject common stock in violation of sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act' 46 respectively. 47 Violations of sections 4 and 12 of the
Clayton Act 48 were also alleged without supporting argument.149 Although the Second Circuit conceded that antitrust claims are not normally arbitrable, 5 0 it noted that a claimant's recourse in such a dispute
143 Coenen dealt with an alleged violation of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934. Wilko involved only the Securities Act of 1933. Despite the Second Circuit's
earlier holding in Axelrod, that the exception (section 28(b)) to the non-waiver provision
(section 29(a)) of the 1934 Act was equally applicable to that of the 1933 Act, the court
relied on the absence of a similar exception from the 1933 Act to distinguish Coenen from
Wilko.
In Axelrod, the finding that section 28(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
applied to section 14 of the Securities Act of 1933 was expressly limited to the facts of
the case. 451 F.2d at 843. In Coenen, the court made no reference to the broadened interpretation given section 28(b) in Axelrod. Judge Mulligan sat in both cases. An explanation
of the factual distinctions which warranted different applications of section 28(b) in the
two instances is desirable. Axelrod relied on the fact that the plaintiff in Wilko was a small
investor and not affected by section 28(b). Coenen depended on the absence of language
similar to that of section 28(b) from the 1933 Act to reach the same result.
144 In Wilko, the plaintiff had executed an agreement to arbitrate differences
between himself and the defendant brokerage firm prior to occurrence of the subject
discord and therefore without knowledge of it. Coenen, on the other hand, was fully
aware of the existence of his claim against Pressprich at the time he contracted to arbitrate
"any" discrepancies between himself and all NYSE member firms. 453 F.2d at 1213. The
non-waiver provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 do not bar arbitration of a
controversy already in existence at the time of the agreement to arbitrate. See Garden v.
Shearson, Hammill & Co., 433 F.2d 367 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 978 (1971);
PearIstein v. Scudder & German, 429 F.2d 1136, 1143 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
1013 (1971); Moran v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, 389 F.2d 242 (3d Cir. 1968).
145 453 F.2d at 1212.

146 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1970).
147 453 F.2d at 1214.
148 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 22 (1970).
149 453 F.2d at 1215.
130 There has been general agreement among the courts that antitrust claims are not
arbitrable. Among the reasons courts have given are: rights adjudicated in an antitrust
dispute affect not only the parties involved but also the public at large. A. 9- E. Plastik
Pak Co. v. Monsanto Co., 396 F.2d 710, 715-16 (9th Cir. 1968); American Safety Equip. Corp.
v J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821, 826-28 (2d Cir. 1968). Arbitrators are not qualified to
properly apply the antitrust laws. Associated Milk Dealers, Inc. v. Local 753, Milk Drivers
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is not limited to litigation and out-of-court settlement is a permissible
alternative. Since the plaintiff had executed the arbitration agreement
with full knowledge of his claim, he was deemed to have consented to
settle his triple damage claim without the aid of the courts. 151
In both Axelrod and Coenen, the Second Circuit supported the
policy of self government of stock exchanges and compelled arbitration
of disputes originally submitted to litigation by a member firm and
an allied member respectively. At the same time, the court expressed
its willingness to exclude the small investor from the scope of parties
subject to the jurisdiction of the stock exchange and achieved that
objective by affording him a less biased forum. 1 52 In applying them to
Union, 422 F.2d 546, 552 (7th Cir. 1970). The severe penalty of treble damages associated
with antitrust law violations evidences a Congressional intent to keep such disputes from
the largely unreviewable power of an arbitrator. Silvercup Bakers Inc. v. Fink Baking
Corp., 273 F. Supp. 159, 163 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
The view that antitrust claims are not arbitrable has also developed on the state level.
See Aimcee Wholesale Corp. v. Tomar Prods., Inc., 21 N.Y.2d 621, 628-30, 237 N.E2d 223,
226-27, 289 N.Y.S.2d 968, 973-74 (1968). In addition to the reasons given above, the New
York Court of Appeals in Aimcee noted that the equitable doctrines of waiver, estoppel,
and in pari delicto would be more readily applied by an arbitrator than by a court of law
thereby weakening the deterrent effect of the antitrust laws. Id. at 629, 237 N.E.2d at 277,
289 N.Y.S.2d at 973.
Perhaps the most often quoted statement on the subject and the one which most
concisely makes the case for barring arbitration of antitrust disputes is found in Circuit
Judge Clark's dissent in Wilko v. Swan, 201 F.2d 439, 445 (2d Cir.) rev'd, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
Commercial arbitration has been highly successful in bringing a businessman's
adjudication to business questions. But it would be vastly unfortunate if it
became useable as a device to blunt or break social legislation.
Id.
The Second Circuit in Coenen, however, noted a recognized exception to the general
rule barring arbitration of antitrust claims, viz., where the agreement to arbitrate takes
place after the dispute arises. 453 F.2d at 1215 and cases cited therein. Coenen was found
to fall within this exception. Id.
151 Id. Judge Medina, writing for a unanimous panel, intimated that the antitrust
count was not supported by the facts alleged in the complaint and was included merely
to provide the plaintiff with an additional avenue by which to pursue redress of his
grievance and collect treble damages. This practice was criticized as an unfortunate
attempt to circumvent the arbitration provisions of the New York Stock Exchange Constitution. The court, therefore, denied the plaintiff's right of action and ordered arbitration
to proceed. Id. at 1215-16.
152 Although the neutrality of an arbitrator is theoretically equal to that of a judge,
the former's repeated contact with a narrow class of parties necessitated by his specialized
role sometimes raises the issue of the arbitrator's objectivity. See Garfield & Co. v. Wiest,
432 F.2d 849 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 940 (1971) wherein plaintiff sought to
vacate an adverse arbitration award on the basis of the arbitrators' failure to fully disclose their former dealings with the defendant brokerage firm. The Second Circuit upheld
the award on the basis of the plaintiff's constructive knowledge, as a member of the NYSE,
that "any arbitrators, by their very connection with the Exchange, would, in the ordinary course of business, have dealings with specialists .... " Id. at 853. However, the
court went on to note that "[w]e find rather unrealistic the Exchange's contention in its
amicus brief that there is no possibility of favoritism ....
Id. at 853-54.
Cases dealing with the issue of an arbitrator's possible bias are not particularly rare.
See, e.g., Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145 (1968), rehearing denied, 393 U.S. 1112 (1969); Saxis S.S. Co. v. Multifacs Int'l Traders, Inc. 375 F.2d
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897

implement these policies, the Second Circuit also demonstrated the
extreme flexibility of the non-waiver sections of the Securities Act of
1983 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 as well as the statutory
exception to the non-waiver provision included in the 1984 Act.
577 (2d Cir. 1967); San Martine Compania De
293 F.2d 796 (9th Cir. 1961); Kentucky River
cert. denied, 346 U.S. 887 (1953); Hyman v.
American Guar. Co. v. Caldwell, 72 F.2d 209

Navegacion, S. A. v. Saguenay Terminals Ltd.,
Mills v. Jackson, 206 F.2d 111 (6th Cir. 1953),
Pottberg's Ex'rs, 101 F.2d 269 (9d Cir. 1939);
(9th Cir. 1934).

